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The total output of an economy usually follows cyclical movements which are accompanied
by similar movements in stock prices. The common explanation relies on the demand side. It
points out that stock market wealth drives consumption which triggers production afterward.
This paper focuses on influences via the supply side of the economy. The aim of the paper is to
explore channels where stock price patterns influence the amount of credit taken by firms. We
examine trend and volatility cycles at the stock market for their impact on the real economy. For
each one we find an application to the investment behaviour of firms. There are three channels
addressed: the stock market valuation as piece of information for the assessment of a firm’s
creditworthiness, the influence on restructuring prospects in times of financial distress and the
stock market related remuneration of the top management affecting capital demand. We ask to
which extent a channel may contribute to the stock price - output relation when there is mutual
feedback. A model a` la Delli Gatti et al. (2005) drives the results. Firms take credit to finance
their production which determines their financial fragility. If their stochastic revenue is too low,
they are bankrupt and leave the economy. The capital loss hurts the bank’s equity base and future
credit supply is diminished. This causes business cycles. Results show that if the bank assesses
creditworthiness according to the stock price then idiosyncratic stock price fluctuations have only
a slight effect as they disturb selection and hinder growth. If stock market optimism matters
for bankruptcy ruling the level of stock owners’ influence does not matter. If optimism is wide
spread among stock investors however, investment behaviour is also correlated through the stock
prices and this results in huge real economy cycles without any long-term growth. If volatility is
considered in the decision of managers they act more prudently and this fosters growth.
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1. Introduction
Economic fluctuations and boom-bust patterns in asset prices occur sometimes in conjunction
while crises in financial markets can turn economic contractions into recessions (Minsky, 1970;
Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005; Bordo and Lane, 2013). This paper aims to explore the possible
causal contributions of assets to economic performance by asking which effect do stock prices
and their patterns have on output via the supply side? The model focuses on bank credit as
the channel that transmits shocks on stock prices to the real economy. This focus on bank
credit is based on two observations: firms finance a significant part of their business by relying
on external sources of funds and, although financial systems differ around the world, credit is
an important external source of funds.
Stock prices are part of the financial market. Nevertheless, they are likely to affect real market
activity. Their impact might be so severe that they cause financial market breakdowns and
recessions (Minsky, 1970). “There are four channels through which stock prices can be con-
sidered to affect [real] activity: (1) the wealth effect on consumption, (2) the Tobin’s Q effect
on investment, (3) the balance sheet effect on private spending (via the credit channel) and
(4) the confidence effect on private spending.” (Altissimo et al., 2005, p. 4.) In academic re-
search, effect (1) has been studied the most while also channel (2) got some distinct attention.
The other channels are usually not pointed out separately (Semmler, 2011, p. 79). Many early
papers focus on the role of increased (perceived) wealth in times of stock market booms as
source of increased consumption which establishes the link between stock markets and the real
economy. By this concept, the stock market leads the economy’s dynamic (Semmler, 2011,
p. 79). More generally, the distinction between asset prices and the financial market is in
order. While it is shown that asset prices indeed contribute to the real economy, for instance
via investment in owned houses (Higgins and Osler, 1998; Semmler, 2011), the link between
other assets, traded at the financial market like bonds or stocks is less proven. Nevertheless,
stock prices are a good indicator for following investment and economic growth (Barro, 1990).
In this paper stock prices fluctuate due to real activity but also due to exogenous random
deviations on top of that. The paper builds upon a model by Delli Gatti et al. (2005)
where excessive leverage in credit financed production may cause bankruptcies. They show
that collateral based credit granting may contribute to model output dynamics that exhibit
features of real world output dynamics. Also, firm sizes and their growth exhibit patterns which
match with empirical regularities. The model is an agent-based model allowing for enough
flexibility to incorporate multiple scenarios about stock market changes. In this paper there
will be three variations of the model carried out by computer simulation using the software
Wolfram Mathematica. Two of the three model extensions comply with the original
paper as it is a special case of the extended model. Therefore, the original model will serve as
a benchmark case. The third variation is only slightly different and exhibits similar dynamics.
The three possible influences treated are first the way credit is granted depends on the stock
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prices. When banks estimate the creditworthiness of borrowers they also refer to the stock price
as piece of information. Secondly, firms in financial distress might be subject to restructuring
and thus survive in cases where the stock market does evaluate its future prospects rather
optimistically. The third influence is that managers may act in response to the stock price if
their payment is also dependent on the stock price. This influences risk taking. The question
addressed is to what extent stock prices have an impact on firms’ dynamic and output via
those various channels. The analysis will be based on comparing scenarios with varying levels
of crucial parameter values to the baseline case where stock prices do not play a role.
This paper contributes to the investment literature by dealing with the influence of stock prices
on the investment behavior of firms (see ECB, 2013; Ormerod, 2009). Due to the agent based
structure it can add further insight to the impact of firm level financing to aggregate growth.
It relates to Minsky’s approach of leverage and financial fragility due to credit and investment
that causes single failures feeding back to the rest of the economy. This two-sided relationship
is not greatly covered in classical macroeconomics: “[m]oreover, it is worth noting that in the
stochastic growth model there is only a one -sided relationship. Real shocks affect stock prices
and returns but shocks to asset prices - or overreaction of asset prices relative to changes in
fundamentals - have no effects on real activity.” (Semmler, 2011, p. 82.)
The results show that all channels do have a significant impact on the dynamics of the
firms and total output. If banks take the stock price into account for their credit offer, this
leads to a more similar evolution across firms because leverage does pay off less for them.
Therefore, financial health gains a higher importance and this induces more persistence in
firms’ differences where the pace of growth is comparatively lower. If stock prices matter for
legally declared bankruptcy a high bargaining power of shareholders is of almost no effect if
stock prices are uncorrelated. If stock prices have a boom-bust pattern the real economy
shows correlating patterns over time because all firms act on those prices simultaneously. In
the last scenario, where managers react on the stock price, they behave ambivalent: in highly
leveraged companies they increase capital demand due to a lower expected remuneration
based on bankruptcy risk while in healthy firms they reduce risk by demanding less capital
and acting more prudent. Managers of highly leveraged firms have a small downside risk as
their payoff is expected to be less certain in the first place.
In the economic literature formal approaches to the causes of crises in economic activity
linked to financial market range from failure propagation approaches in networks (Battiston
et al., 2007) to asymmetric information concepts (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). The particular
mutual dependency of credit obligations between -in general banks and firms, but also among
firms and banks themselves - might contribute to an amplification of failures. Not only is the
effect of idiosyncratic failure of different effect on an economy as Gabaix (2011) points out
in his granular model, but the connectedness of economic agents might lead to contagion.
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Gabaix (2011) shows that it matters which firm is hit by a shock or a crises for the economy,
for instance due to the firm size a shock to major players like General Electric might influence
the economy more than foreclosure of the neighborhood grocery store. He shows that the
empirically proven power law distribution of firm sizes can propagate idiosyncratic shocks in a
way such that business cycles emerge (Gabaix, 2011).
According to the Basel II regulations banks need to have their credit engagements rated. They
can do this themselves (internal rating) or hire some rating agency to do it (external rating).
Ratings will be done using a mix of information consisting of quantitative and qualitative
information (Reichling et al., 2003). To the best of our knowledge, there is no literature that
assesses the impact of rating strategies at an economy-wide scale. Literature dealing with
rating methods is concerned about the predictive accuracy of the method as this is crucial
for practitioners such as banks or rating agencies. For instance, Altman coined the "Z-Score"
as a bankruptcy predictor (Altman, 1968). This approach is used in many refined ways so
that rating agencies and banks have their own slightly different methods of rating (Altman
and Saunders, 1998; Crouhy et al., 2000; Reichling et al., 2003). Our approach deals with
the impact of actual customs at financial markets in an economy-wide context. We motivate
our analysis with rating methods that comprise stock market valuations as piece of qualitative
information (Crouhy et al., 2000; Reichling et al., 2003; Standard and Poor’s, 2011). Our
results contribute to the business cycle literature with financial constraints as they assess the
overall impact of the information usage on economic outcomes.
As the legal processes are a major source of political risk in any country those bankruptcy laws
are important for investment decisions. We contribute to the literature of economic impacts
of bankruptcy laws by assessing the impact of stakeholders’ influence on the business cycle.
In our model the degree of the transmission of stock price variation is the main mechanism.
The impact of bankruptcy law on business cycles is addressed by Suarez and Sussman (2007).
They find that more firm friendly laws, that is a higher chance of not being declared bankrupt,
has a possible adverse long-term effect. While more firms continue to exist in the short run,
lenders may require higher levels of collateral in the long-run which diminishes growth. Their
idea of soft laws is based also on shareholders’ bargaining power which is the transmission
channel of stock prices in our model. In a simpler argument Lee et al. (2007) point out that
soft laws may be beneficial as they promote a larger variety of firms. They deem this desirable
for the society. In a general equilibrium context, modest levels of bankruptcy punishment can
be beneficial because they make creditors and lenders better off (Dubey et al., 1995).
Our results indicate that the law is of minor effect if the firms are affected idiosyncratically by
stock prices. If there is correlation among stock prices, for instance through boom-bust cycles,
a firm friendly ruling would also result in extreme variations and business cycles. Those come
however, with no long term growth in the model because there is no further equity injected.
Therefore, in the presence of boom-bust cycles at the stock market we would recommend a
bankruptcy law that is not too firm friendly.
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The compensation of managers can actually consist of several components. Besides from the
salary there are performance based payoffs that serve as incentive for the managers. This
incentive can differ. Bryan et al. (2000) point out that for instance, granted stocks may lead
to more prudent behaviour while stock options might increase the risk taking. This is due to
the different payoff structure which is linear in granted stocks but not in stock options where
managers do not bear the downside risk.
There is a recent debate as to cap the bonuses of bank managers since wrong incentives have
been deemed to contribute in the financial crisis of 2007. As a result, the European Union [EU]
passed a law with effect of January 1, 2014 that effectively limits the bonus payments of bank
managers to 100% of their fixed salary. (EU, 2013: Article 94,1,g,(i) and (ii)). Managers
in the United Kingdom even face a claw-back rule put into effect from January 2015 on.
According to that, they can be forced to pay back bonuses over a period of seven years after
their awarding. This is a form of ex post risk adjustment in order to “align better the interests
of staff subject to the Remuneration Code with the long -term interests of the firm.” (Bank
of England, 2014.) In the model the bankruptcy costs are taken into account by the managers
since they suffer from the termination of their contracts. If there is only fixed salary, they
loose only their salary which matches with the cost concept of Delli Gatti et al. However, if
part of their salary is also granted stocks in a performance based remuneration scheme, there
might be also a loss positively related to the current stock price.
Our model results indicate that there is a complex impact of performance based compensation.
For low levels (share is below about 1/2) any increase does hardly increase output but causes
a higher interest rate. However, for a share above 1/2 a further increase does increase the
interest rate only marginally but boosts output. Policy advise is therefore depending on the
current level of performance based compensation and on the particular issue that should be
promoted. In comparison to the EU law this means that it makes sense to hold the managers
accountable since this induces sensitive behaviour. If managers behave sensitive, volatility
cycles at the stock market do not harm the economy very much.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 gives an overview of the model. Then, the impact
of bank policy is introduced in section 3. The impact of different bankruptcy circumstances
is discussed in section 4 and last the impact of managerial behaviour with respect to stock
prices is examined in section 5. Section 6 discusses the results.
2. The Model
The model is based on work of Greenwald & Stiglitz and subsequent work of Delli Gatti et
al. (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1990,1993; Delli Gatti et al., 2005). A core feature is that
firms’ managers act in a risk averse manner because bankruptcy of the firm is costly for them
personally. Credit financing and leverage exposes the firm to financial fragility. Therefore,
they take possible bankruptcy costs into consideration when they use bank loans for financing
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desired production. The use of credit drives the economy and has an ambivalent impact which
induces fluctuations: a higher amount of credit increases leverage which possibly induces higher
profits but at the same time also increases financial fragility.
Bankruptcy is costly for the management first of all due to the loss of salary but also the loss
of reputation and further reemployment might become more difficult. A further assumption
is that the costs of bankruptcy increase in firm size because usually there are more managers
involved in large companies (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1990, p. 17). Greenwald and Stiglitz
also point out that financial distress can occur in different ways and does not always lead
to bankruptcy (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1990, p. 17, footnote 5). While for the company
financial distress does not automatically mean the end of the firm, usually one of the first
measures undertaken in such situations is to replace management. Therefore, as soon as there
is financial distress, managers most probably suffer from a monetary loss which is at least
foregone salary. The issue of financial distress and bankruptcy is incorporated in the model by
Delli Gatti et al. (2005) in the simple way that financial distress automatically leads to the
liquidation of the firm.
2.1. baseline setup
We first recall the model introduced by Delli Gatti et al. (2005). We add equity and stock
prices in section 2.2. Other extensions are presented in the following sections. Net worth of a
firm i at time t, that is in general assets minus liabilities due in t, is denoted Ait . This notation
refers to the net worth at the end of period t. It consists of the net worth at the end of the
prior period plus net profits from the current period. Often, this net worth is also referred to
as "equity". If the firm has not issued any shares, net worth is the same as the sum of all
retained profits up to the end of period t.
Ait = Ait−1+piit (1)
Assume that the firms transform financial means into productive capital without any costs.
Productive capital Kit is then the sum of net worth taken over from the prior period Ait−1 and
credit taken in the current period, Lit :
Kit = Ait−1+Lit (2)
Output Yit is produced by applying constant returns to scale φ to productive capital:
Yit = φKit (3)
Profit depends on the price uit that applies to the output and the costs for setting up capital
which consists of retooling costs g> 0 and rental costs for capital rit . Assume that the costs
for credit and the real return to capital are the same and apply hence to the entire stock of
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productive capital:
piit = uitφKit−gritKit (4)
with uit being random and uniformly distributed with support between zero and two. Therefore,
E[piit ] = (φ −grit)Kit . A firm is bankrupt when its assets are insufficient to repay the debt at
the end of a period:
Ait < 0 (5)
This condition states that a firm whose equity (net worth) is below zero will be dissolved and
leaves the economy. It is assumed that firms can sell their products at a market isolated from
all others ("islands") and that they can sell their entire production. Nevertheless, they face
uncertainty in the price uit which is unique on each island and period. This approach is in
line with the fact that a lot of financial distress stems from defaulting customers (Reichling et
al. (2007), p.223). Therefore, the random price which yields a random revenue can also be
interpreted as the share of sales that is actually paid for. Taking into account the bankruptcy
condition and equations (1) and (4), the price that just sustains a firm is
uit =
grit
φ
− Ait−1
Kitφ
(6)
Assume that the costs of bankruptcy depend on the size of the enterprise in the form c f = cY 2
with c > 0 being a constant. Assume further that managers take into account these costs
of bankruptcy when deciding about the demand for capital in each period. They base their
decision on the expected profit
Γit = (φ −grit)Kit−E(c f ) (7)
while the expected costs of bankruptcy E(c f ) are determined by the probability of bankruptcy
Prob(BR) = Prob(uit < uit) = uit/2 for u ∼ Uniform[0,2]. Demand for capital is the result
of the maximization of expected profit. Using the first order condition and solving for capital
yields Kdit =
φ−grit
cφgrit +
Ait−1
2grit
. Credit demand is the difference between demand for capital and
retained profits Ldit = K
d
it −Ait−1, yielding
Ldit =
1
cφgrit
(
cφ
2
Ait−1(1−2grit)+φ −grit
)
(8)
The banks’ profit (piBt ) depends on the revenue from loans granted minus the costs of raising
those funds from equity EBt and deposits Dt :
piBt = ∑
i∈Nt
ritLsit− rt [(1−ω)Dt−1+EBt−1] (9)
Here, ω describes the degree of competition within the banking sector and is a measure for
the mark up the bank can charge on interest above deposits. The interest paid on deposit is
rt(1−ω) where rt is assumed to be the weighted average lending interest rate. When a firm
goes bankrupt at the end of a period, the banking sector as a whole suffers a loss equal to the
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difference between the amount of credit supplied in period t and the relative mortgage (value of
assets), which is the same as the (negative) amount of net worth: Bit = Lit−(Kit+piit) =−Ait .
The banking sector’s equity base evolves according to the law of motion:
EBt = pi
B
t +E
B
t−1− ∑
i∈ Ωt
Bit (10)
Here, Ωt is the set of all bankrupt firms in period t. The bank lends a multiple of its prior
equity base according to some multiplier Lst =
1
νE
B
t−1 which is based on regulatory constraints.
Credit supply emerges from the banks equity base EBt and deposits Dt in the form L
s
t = E
B
t +Dt
while deposits are treated as a residual. Write αit = Ait/∑iAit and κit = Kit/∑iKit . Credit
supply is then
Lsit = L
s
t [λκit−1+(1−λ )αit−1] (11)
The interest rate rit for each firm is determined by the equilibrium situation where credit
demand matches credit supply. From that condition this rate is
rit =
1
2cgLsit + 2gc(
1
φc +Ait−1)
(2+Ait−1) (12)
Entry depends on the average interest rate rt which determines the number of possible entrants
and the features of the entrant is determined by a random draw. The term is:
Nentryt = NProb(entry) =
N
1+ ed(rt−1− f )
(13)
where N > 1, d, and f are constants. This assures that the probability of number of entrants is
low if the overall interest rate is high. The term is then rounded to an integer.1 New firms are
endowed with capital and net worth randomly. The draw for an entrant’s capital endowment
is from a uniform distribution with a center at the mode of incumbents’ capital. Then, the
equity ratio αit = Ait/∑iAit is determined by the mode of all incumbents’ equity base Ait and
the capital ratio is κit = Kit/∑iKit . Those ratios are needed by the bank in order to determine
the credit supply for each new firm.
2.2. stock price
We now include equity and stock prices in the model. If firms have also access to equity
markets, they can raise capital by issuing shares. If those are traded at a stock exchange their
price can be thought of to consist of a “fair” component, that is the fundamental value Fit ,
and a deviation θit from that.
Pit = Fit +θit (14)
1In the original paper, the number of initial firms is 100, N = 180, d = 100 and f = 0.1. with 1000 iterations.
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The fair stock market value depends on net worth and on the overall equity that a firm has
FitEit ≡ Eit +Πit = Ait (15)
Here Πit refers to retained profits up to period t. Note that total equity of a firm will consist
of the equity raised through issued shares Eit and net worth which is accumulated profits Πit .
The above specification is based on the assumption that each share has a nominal value of
1 unit of currency, therefore the number of shares equals the nominal value of shareholders’
equity, both denoted by Eit . Hence there is exactly one share of nominal value 1 for each firm.
Furthermore, the fair share price is just the net value over the number of shares issued. In
the remainder of the paper we will assume that Eit = 1 for all i, t, implying that Ait = Fit and
Pit = Ait +θit .
The actual stock price Pit could deviate from the “fair” price because of the expectations of
investors:
1. the future inflow of cash is supposed to be significantly large or small;
2. speculators pay premiums (sell at discounts) in order to benefit from expected even larger
(lower) prices in the future.2
This specification follows the idea that market valuation on average represents the discounted
sum of all expected cash flow, represented by profits in this setup. If these expectations are very
optimistic, there can be a mark up which is not justified alone by just the actually observable
profit. The relation between the mark up on firm value and the error in profit estimation is
θit = |piit |εit .
This expresses that the markup on firm value (LHS) is just the markup on expected cash flow,
here today’s profit (RHS).
This markup on (fair) market value is assumed to be a function of profits and a random
component. The overall market value of cash flow based on profits and the error is supposed
to be given by piit + |piit |εit = ρ(piit ,εit). This means that a positive error always leads to a
more favorable profit estimation, also for negative profits. The sign of the error is preserved
in this way. The error might occur for some time span. The persistence in this error can be
induced if the error is modeled as a random walk.3
εit = εit−1+ηitση (16)
where η ∼N (0,1) and 0< ση < 1. Hence, E(εit) = εit−1.
The complete expression for the stock price is hence
Pit = Ait + |piit | (εit−1+ηitση) .
2Note that 1. affects the fair value of shares while 2. may occur due to speculation (exogenous to the firm) .
3If there is also a drift in the random walk, then this would represent general phases of optimism or pessimism.
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3. The Role of the Stock Market Value in Credit Decisions
The stock market value of a firm carries information that is valuable for a bank for two reasons.
First, the valuation on the stock market might reveal some information about a firm’s ability
to raise funds from the asset market. Second, it reveals information about the market’s
estimation of the relative prospect of the firm. The stock market usually indicates changes
of firm’s prospects earlier than the income statement or the balance sheet.4 Therefore, the
stock market value is a piece of forward looking information rather than the backward looking
balance sheet analysis. Furthermore, “[s]tock market based information ... has responded more
quickly to changing financial conditions than ratings of credit risk agencies.” (Bongini et al.
(2002), p. 1011.) This is an incentive to free-ride on external information since assessing
creditworthiness is costly, as is monitoring.
In order to represent the impact of the stock price on credit supply we shall assume in this
setting that credit supply is determined according to:
Lsit = L
s
t
[
(1−µ)λ Kit−1
Kt−1
+(1−µ)(1−λ )Ait−1
At−1
+ µ
PEit Eit
∑iPEit Eit
]
(11a)
where 0< λ < 1 represents the weight put on relative firm size and 0< µ < 1 stands for the
weight put on the relative stock market value. The third piece of information used for the
decision is the relative net value. We run simulations for increasing values of µ while for each
value there are a number of repetitions. Results are taken from an interval over 51 periods,
between t = 1000 and t = 1050. The average is computed. This is done for each of 100
repetitions for any parameter value and for those 100 results from each parameter value also
the average is taken. Note that the simulations for µ = 0 also represent the benchmark case
which matches the Delli Gatti et al. (2005) model. The results in our baseline case are in line
with the findings of Delli Gatti et al. (2005). While they focus on the distribution of firm
sizes and their growth rates we will put emphasize on total output and the average interest
rate in our analysis.
(a) output over time baseline case (b) output over time µ = 1
(c) output
Figure 1: Impact of µ on output
4For a more detailed discussion, see Atiya (2001), p. 930-932 or Altman (1968).
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As a firms stock price - for given nominal equity - rises in total equity, a firm that possesses
more equity has an increasing advantage if the banking sector refers more to the stock price.
The impact of relative capital and thus output is decreasing in µ . Therefore, equity has
relatively more weight. That is, less fragile firms get relatively more credit offered because
the total assets Kit are without effect for large µ . This means that only firms with relatively
low leverage get access to credit. The total output in the economy however, is lower because
firms that otherwise produce at the brink of bankruptcy have less access to credit. Firms that
are less fragile get funded over proportionally compared to the case where µ = 0 but only
offer a really low interest rate for that. This dampens the evolution of credit supply and thus
total output. This low interest rate is the key for their advantage in growth which is visible in
the Herfindahl index (figure 2c). Comparing representative runs shows that under the stock
market relevance regime (µ = 1) there is a fast movement to the dominance of a monopolist
(figure 2b). Furthermore, if credit is offered less strictly, comparatively many firms survive
(figure 3) . This is also a reason why total output is lower in this regime: more firms leave the
industry and there are less periods where there is no capital lost due to bankruptcy. Differences
(a) Market Power baseline case (b) Market Power with µ = 1
(c) Market Power
Figure 2: Impact of µ on market concentration
in firm size are less decisive for credit due to µ because there is additional noise. Nevertheless,
we observe that market power increases in µ (figure 2c). Concentration therefore stems from
exiting firms.
(a) numberof firms baseline case (b) number of firms µ = 1
(c) no. of exits
Figure 3: Impact of µ on the no. of firms
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Economically, if some firm faces a markdown εit < 0, it will be offered less credit in the
following period. Nevertheless, as its equity Ait is the same, it still demands the same amount
of capital. This leads to a higher equilibrium interest rate for that firm in the upcoming period
and less leverage which will lead to lower profits. This means, that the markdown also leads
to lower credit supply in the following period. This effect is even more severe since there is
persistence in the markup/markdown. Even for a one time markdown, there is a long term
effect in diminished credit supply and hence hindered firm growth.
If some firm faces a mark up (ε > 0) it is offered more credit and thus experiences higher
growth and lower interest rates in the following period. It is more leveraged and will grow
faster. The growth advantage is however, less pronounced if the bank predominantly puts
weight on the stock price. Then the advantage from a markup on profit is less than an
advantage from size due to the magnitude of the underlying value.
The additional noise disturbs the selection process in that some fragile firms are offered more
credit and some robust firms are constrained for reasons other than their financial situation.
If we consider only the balance-sheet situation as a benchmark, stock market expectations are
exogenous. We cannot verify whether there would actually be reason to grant more credit due
to some positive outlook. The only information from the model is the financial situation. A
selection process based on this information is disturbed by the additional noise which hurts
total output in the long run compared to a situation where only model internal information is
used.
4. Firm Distress and Restructuring
In this section we distinguish between insolvency and bankruptcy in order to tackle the ques-
tion how the stock price can influence the fate of a financially distressed firm in a bankruptcy
negotiation. The impact may have implications for designing a favourable institutional frame-
work. Mere financial distress may hurt business, but does not mean that a firm will cease to
exist. Whether it can resolve financial distress and sustain as a going concern depends very
much on the expectations of its creditors and shareholders - along with its capital structure
and the legal framework in each particular country.
Consider that the stock market value instead of net worth determines bankruptcy of a firm.
Most of the large firms are publicly listed firms whose market value is determined at the stock
exchanges. Empirical evidence shows that when a bankruptcy case is filed courts do take the
stock market value into account for their ruling about bankruptcy. Usually, the stock market
price serves as source of information complementary to the ability to issue bonds and credit
ratings based on cash flow projections. Occasionally however, the stock market price is the
major determinant of bankruptcy ruling (Sabry and Hrycay, 2014).
Note that mere insolvency already occurs when net worth is negative: Ait < 0. Since restruc-
turing could take place, insolvency does not automatically mean that a firm cannot continue
to exist. For instance, if a firm has a negative cash amount but the evaluation of its future
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cash flow is still optimistic it can survive. The initial public offering [IPO] of ’Rocket Internet’
which took place on Oct. 2, 2014 may serve as example. The IPO collected 1.5 bn Euros
which left the internet company with a total market value of 5.5 bn Euros, about the same
value as Lufthansa. This is remarkable since ’Rocket Internet’ has low revenues and huge
losses. Therefore, the market value is "predominantly based on the hope of a glorious future"
(FAZ, 2014). This is also visible in the fact that the shares sold at the top end of the price
range but lost more than 20% of their value within the first days of trading. Accordingly,
in the model setup, a stock price mark-up θit would be high because investors think that in
the long run the firm will recover and be able to repay all of its current debt. A bankruptcy
condition based on market value hence takes the expectations into account:
Ait−1+ρ(piit ,εit) ≡ Fit +θit︸ ︷︷ ︸
stock market value
< 0.
The stock market value consists of inherited net value Ait−1 and the market valuation of
current profit ρ(piit ,εit) which is equivalent to the end-of-period net value Fit and a mark-up
θit .
Whether they can be rescued and go on profitably, depends on all of its stakeholders. Many
parties are allowed to file for bankruptcy: creditors might try to recover part of their loans
to a firm and seek foreclosure in order to rescue as much asset value as possible, owners
(shareholders) might not be willing to inject further money into the firm and maybe also
to limit losses by liquidating the firm, and at last, the firm itself may file for insolvency.
Focusing on the interest of the provider of funds, each group has some bargaining power in
the restructuring negotiations. While a bank would be willing to file for bankruptcy, optimistic
shareholders, who do not want to lose their investment, could be able to convince the bank
to roll over the loan once again. They are more likely to be successful if the stock market
value of a firm is high. Assume there is a parameter ns ∈ [0,1] representing the shareholders’
influence, the firm would be dissolved and leave the economy if
Ait−1+piit + nsθit < 0. (5b)
If the shareholders have no influence on the bank’s decision, the bankruptcy condition is as in
Delli Gatti 2005 and the market markup does not play any role. If they have influence, any
markup makes actual bankruptcy less likely. Equation (5b) covers the different interests of
stakeholders. The bank would file for the firm to go in formal bankruptcy if Ait−1+piit is not
sufficient. The shareholders have a deviating interest which is expressed in θit . The parameter
ns determines to what extent this deviation is crucial. In conjunction with θit , nsθit shows
how much the hard facts are influenced by stock market expectation and can be understood
as measure for legal circumstances and policies applied in an economy.
Each firm’s demand for capital is affected by the new bankruptcy condition. Recall that profit
is revenue minus capital costs
piit = (uitφ −grit)Kit .
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The new bankruptcy condition is in detail
Ait−1+(uitφ −grit)Kit + nsθit < 0.
This can be solved for
uit =
1
Kitφ
[Kitgrit− (Ait−1+θitns)] . (6b)
Doing the same steps as in the baseline model, this crucial price uit is used in the probability
of bankruptcy. Firms do not know the mark up on profit at the end of the period and they
form naive expectations in the form
E[θitns] = θit−1ns (17)
It is assumed that the influence of stockholders ns is known for example due to the legal
institutions and that the management does not know how the stock market forms expectation
of future profits. Therefore, the firms do not know how the mark up θit actually comes up.
They know, however, the deviation of the prior stock price from the net value and it is assumed
that they simply expect this deviation to persist. After maximizing profit, capital demand is
determined by
Kdit =
φ −grit
cφgrit
+
Ait−1+θit−1ns
2grit
.
The banking sector also reacts on a distressed firm. It will not take into account the (negative)
net worth of distressed firms. Since the capital ratio of a distressed firm is very low, such a
firm will be offered little credit via the market share rule. The bank’s rule is now
Lsit =
Lst [λα˜it +(1−λ )κit ] for Ait−1 > 0,Lst [(1−λ )κit ] else. (11b)
Here α˜it = Ait−1∑i∈∆t Ait−1 and ∆t is the set of all firms that are solvent in period t. This ensures
that all individual credit offers sum up to Lst again. Compared to a situation where insolvent
firms leave the pool of assessment there is less credit supply for the solvent firms. Thus,
by construction, if there exist insolvent but not yet bankrupt firms, the solvent ones are
comparatively worse off due to a tougher assessment. The equilibrium interest rate is
rit =
2+(Ait−1+θit−1ns)c
2gcφ (Lsit +Ait−1+
1
cφ )
(12b)
It is easy to see that capital demand and hence equilibrium interest increases in the markup on
profit. If the stock market values the firm extremely high, managers can afford to take higher
risks as the firm will be less likely to go bankrupt.
It is possible, that the bank credit offer does not suffice to offset the negative net value carried
over to the next period. In this case, there would be negative productive capital. This is
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excluded in the simulation as the productive capital must be at least zero. Therefore,
Kit =
Ait−1+Lit , for Ait−1+Lit > 0,0, else. (18)
Figure 4 shows that the credit demand curve contingent on the interest rate shifts upwards in
Figure 4: credit demand ns = 1
(black→ ε = 0, red→ ε > 0, green→ ε < 0)
θit . This shift is larger in the influence parameter of the shareholders ns. If there is a positive
stock market influence an actual bankruptcy is less likely. Therefore, the expected costs of
bankruptcy are lower which boosts credit demand by firms and vice versa.
4.1. no stock market mood swings
As the firms in the model operate on "isolated islands" which makes their product prices
independent, the same is true for stock prices in this section. This adds some further noise
to the expected costs of bankruptcy. However, the noise is auto correlated in the short run.
The question is whether the firms take more or less risk compared to the initial model and
whether this influences the output pattern. The comparative analysis is done for different levels
of influence of shareholders in restructuring negotiations ns ∈ [0,1]. There are 100 repeated
simulations for each parameter value while the interval is covered in 10 incremental steps.
The impact of positive markups is that distressed firms can survive but that might only have
a short postponing effect. Figure 5b shows that the bargaining power of shareholders does
not have a significant impact on the evolution of the economy. Total output, the interest rate
and market power do not change in the bargaining power. The reason is that some firms pay
relatively more interest if they face a markup but others pay relatively less. The representative
run in figure 6 reveals that the dynamics over time are distinct. Especially the interest rate
fluctuates severely (figure 6c). The output has a pattern of distinct economic booms and
recessions (figure 6a) while the firm number also is somewhat cyclical (figure 6b). There
seems to be a clear tendency toward market concentration while this is frequently disturbed
(figure 6d). This indicates that also large firms are likely to go bankrupt. They could be hit
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(a) total output (log) (b) average interest rate (c) Market Power
Figure 5: Impact of bargaining power
(a) GDP without drift (b) Firm number without drift (c) Average interest rate, no drift
(d) Market Power without drift (e) Bad Debt without drift
Figure 6: Time series for high bargaining power of shareholders
by a severe markdown. On average though, a clear impact of the bargaining power cannot be
distinguished.
The legal framework does not seem to have much of an influence if stock prices are not
correlated.
4.2. boom bust periods
Stock markets exhibit cycles which can be caused by fundamental changes due to real economic
cycles. They can also show booms and busts which are are considered to be overreactions not
justified by fundamental data. Those booms and busts can be driven by herd behaviour, for
instance. This kind of speculation is introduced exogenous to the model by adding a drift to
the random walk of εit :
εit = εit−1+ηitση + sin
( t
40
)
.
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This means that the errors are correlated and the drift lifts all deviations equally or diminishes
them by the same amount. If there are phases of booms and busts, as described by the drift
(a) GDP with drift (b) Firm number with drift (c) Average interest rate, drift
(d) Market Power with drift (e) Bad Debt with drift
Figure 7: Time Series for high bargaining power of shareholders with stock market drift
in the random walk, the real economy reacts distinctively on stock market mood. Figures 7a
to 7e show the extreme situation where shareholders’ bargaining power is ns = 1. The market
drift is also depicted, but for graphical reasons amplified in the images.
Total output (figure 7a), the number of firms (7b) and the average interest rate (figure 7c)
respond to boom-bust cycles of the stock market. For high mark ups many firms go bankrupt
which also causes deep recessions. the average interest is generally high in such phases which
causes the large number of bankruptcies and the depression times. Market power varies a lot
(figure 7d) but there is no clear correlation with the stock price swings visible.
If the bargaining power of stock holders is high and there are booms every firm has an increased
demand for credit (see also figure 4), which is the cause of high interest rates. The reason
is that the probability of bankruptcy is comparatively low. If the stock price mark ups are
uncorrelated the effects on single firms more or less cancel out each other. If there is correlation
there is also correlation in credit demand and all firms face higher interest rates.
Figure 7 depicts a drastic scenario where the stock holders have maximum bargaining power.
Almost all firms are certain that their shareholders would not let them go bankrupt in times
of stock market booms. Therefore, they all have low expected bankruptcy costs which causes
them to demand high amounts of capital. As long as the markup increases but is not too high
yet, firms pay a high interest rate which induces high credit supply in the following period.
Then, leverage will increase and output will grow along with net value. At some point leverage
is too high to sustain the high interest rate and there is a deep slump in output.
Over time the total output does not grow and only exhibits cycles. If firms pay high interest
rates there is no profit that can be retained and add to the net worth. Capital may increase
due to increasing credit supply but the collateral basis does not improve over time on a wider
scale. In such a scenario it would be good to implement a policy that limits the influence of
shareholders in bankruptcy procedures.
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5. Stock-related Remuneration
In this section we base the managements’ payoff on the stock price at the end of a period.
Two questions will be addressed: if some share of the management compensation consists of
granted shares, how does this affect total output and the average interest rate? And what
impact do volatility cycles have in this context? In major corporations the overall payment of
managers consists of a package that includes fixed salaries and a performance-based payout.
This performance-based payout is linked to the stock price by granting some shares or issuing
stock options. This means that the higher the stock price, given a prior benchmark, the higher
the managers’ salary.5 We consider a management that is concerned about the likely stock
price at the end of a period only. They do not consider any further price increases or decreases
since we assume that they could sell the stock immediately.6 The stock price at the particular
point in time is then uncertain also due to the volatility that reigns in the stock market. It is a
well established fact of financial markets that volatility is persistent (Bollerslev and Jubinsky,
1999; Lux and Kaizoji, 2007) and that it is also positively correlated with trading volume
(Karpoff, 1987; Brock and Lebaron, 1996). The connection between stock market volatility
and business cycles is discussed by Fornari and Mele (2010). They find that aggregate stock
market volatility explains up to 55% of real growth. Theoretical models of this connection
differ in the timing of the correlation. There are models that explain countercyclical influences
(Campbell and Cochrane, 1999) while others explain procyclical connections (Bernanke et al.,
1999). The countercyclical models assume no feedback from the real economy to asset prices
while the financial accelerator approach of Bernanke et al. does (See Fornari and Mele, 2010).
We stick to the latter concept and build in exogenous levels of stock market volatility on top
of the real economy feedback. Furthermore, we stay as close as possible to the prior approach
and model volatility as sensitivity to profit, that is the level of profit extrapolation.
The Greenwald and Stiglitz approach acknowledges that the leverage a (non-financial) firm
manager is willing to take in order to finance production is bound by the conditional probability
of bankruptcy. The reason is that those managers do bear the downside risk by loss in
reputation ("being a bad manager") and loss in salary due to unemployment if the firm goes
bankrupt. If the firm is a corporation (i.e. a publicly listed company) the management
remuneration is likely to depend also on the stock performance. In that case a manager
would take the expected stock price into account for his or her capital demand decision. In
the underlying model the stock price affects the manager’s decision of how much leverage to
accept.
With this context there needs to be some abstraction from the former approach. Since there
is no labour market in the model, there are also no wages for the management or workers. If
5There are different sorts of stock-related compensations which have a contrary effect on risk taking. See Bryan, Hwang, and
Lilien (2000) for more details. As for bank managers, this type of compensation has been discussed as contribution to the
financial crisis due to subprime lending as banks could benefit from their earnings but their losses were borne by taxpayers
through bailouts. The managers had each incentive to take large risks in exchange for the chance of large earnings. See
Admati & Hellwig (2013), pp. 122,123 for some more detailed discussion. Since a payment in common stocks is possibly
one of the easiest way to look at, this is chosen for this approach.
6Usually, there are some minimum holding times before managers can sell the stock granted.
17
the remuneration is tackled as channel of influence, there needs to be a distinction between
the acting managers and the owners of the firm. The managers’ decision problem under
investigation is not to maximize mere expected profit for the firm but to maximize their own
expected payoff.
The remuneration package of the management is assumed to consist of the number of company
shares ϕit granted as incentive and a fixed salary cMit which also depends on the firm size in the
form cMit = φKitcm where cm > 0 is a constant. The value of the compensation piMit depends
on the stock price that is realized at the end of the period and the share of salary that is
paid in granted shares β ∈ [0,1]: piMit = βϕitPEit +(1−β )cMit . Note that the stock price itself
depends positively on profit. Assuming the costs of bankruptcy borne by the management
include losses from future salary and reputation, this is captured by c fit . The management
can only reap the benefits from granted stocks if the firm is not bankrupt. If the firm goes
bankrupt, they suffer the costs c fit . Denote the probability of bankruptcy as Prob(BR) = Pit .
The expected payoff for the management is
E[piMit ] = (1−Pit)βϕitE[Pit ]+ (1−β )cMit +Pitc fit (19)
where c fit < 0, β ∈ [0,1]. Stocks are assumed to be traded at the end of each period when
investors know whether a firm will continue existing and under which conditions. Therefore,
the stock price at period t is not known when the investment decision of the management is
due. It is assumed that the number of granted shares is smaller for single managers if the share
price is high so that the individual performance based remuneration on average does not grow
just because the firm is large. On firm level we assume a relation ϕit ≡ EitAit φKit . Furthermore,
we again assume that Eit = E = 1 for all i, t. The managers’ expected payoff is in detail
E[piMit ] = (1−Pit)β
1
Ait
φKitE[Pit ]+ (1−β )φKitcm+Pitcφ2K2it .
Remember that Pit = uit2 . Managers are assumed to have some knowledge about the compo-
sition of the stock price and they try to maximize their payoff by influencing the stock price.
The management knows the prior period deviation of the stock price from the fair value of
the company. They also can figure out how much the market over- or undervalued the profit.
Therefore, they have some expectation about the deviation. Assume that εit still is the mar-
ket deviation from the value of profit. But assume now that the management does see it as
sensitivity to profit. Then, εit also determines an amplification of negative profits. We specify
Pit = Ait +piitεit (20)
The term εit can now be understood as markup on the multiplier of profit if we assume that
the stock price is supposed to be a multiple of profit or dividend. This refers to the concept
that share prices should reflect the present value of the expected stream of dividends.
The managers’ payoff depends on the expected valuation of net worth and on the probability
that the firm is not bankrupt at the end of the period. The stock price is positive only if the
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firm is not bankrupt. The expected stock price is
E [Pit ] =
(
Ait−1
E
+(φ −grit)Kit +(φ −grit)KitE[εit ]E
)
The managers optimize their expected payoff from equation (20) by choosing the amount of
capital to employ for production:
Kdit =
Ait−1
2 [(E+ εit−1+ 1)β (grit−φ )−βφ −E]+ (β −1)Eφcb
β (E+ εit−1)
(
g2r2it−3gritφ + 2φ2
)−Egritφ
Then, the equilibrium interest rate becomes:
r1/2 =
gφ
(
2cbEit + 6βEit + 6βεit
) Ait−1gβ (1+Eit+εit )
Lsit+Ait−1
−4βφ2 (Eit + ε)
+
√(
gφ
(
2cbEit + 6βEit + 6βεit
) Ait−1gβ (1+Eit+εit )
Lsit+Ait−1
)2
+ 8g2β (Eit + ε)−4g2β (Eit + ε) 1Lsit+Ait−1 (Ait−1βφ (2+Eit + εit )+ cφEit (−2β + 2+Ait−1))
−4βφ2 (Eit + ε)
(12c)
Details about the computation are provided in Appendix B.
Since this setting deviates slightly from the baseline case we start with examining the case
where the management is paid only a fixed salary. Compared to the baseline case of the prior
(a) GDP Scen. (3) (b) Firm number with Scen. (3) (c) Average interest rate, Scen. (3)
(d) Market Power Scen. (3) (β low) (e) Bad Debt Scen. (3)
Figure 8: uncorrelated stock prices (β low)
two settings here the interest rate is slightly higher on average as is total output. Figure 8
shows the over time dynamics of a typical baseline scenario. There are business cycle patterns
(figure 8a) and the number of firms active is increasing (figure 8b). The interest rate is
fluctuating a lot (figure 8c). Due to the increasing number of firms the market power is low
but occasionally there is a high market power (figure 8d). The bad debt shows that there are
frequent bankruptcies but those are usually small firms (figure 8e).
The dynamics resemble the baseline scenario of the underlying model except that the interest
rate varies more. The reason is that due to the fixed payoff component the payoff is less
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sensitive to the interest rate. Therefore, for given credit supply the equilibrium interest rate
varies more. Figure 9a shows the equilibrium interest rate depending on net worth and the
(a) sensitivity to performance-based share (b) sensitivity to stock price extrapolation
Figure 9: interest sensitivity
share of stock based compensation. The amount of credit supply is fixed so that the net
worth indicates the leverage of a firm. If the leverage is high, that is, the net worth is low,
then an increasing share of stock based compensation leads to a higher equilibrium interest
rate. If the leverage is low, then an increasing share of stock based remuneration leads
to a decreasing equilibrium interest rate (figure 9a). This picture also shows that for any
distribution of leverage, a higher share of stock price based compensation will result in a
narrower distribution of equilibrium interest rates. The interest sensitivity to the amplification
of profit shows a similar pattern (figure 9b).
This indicates that managers demand higher capital if their payoff relies on a good perfor-
mance of the firm but once the firm is financially sound, a higher β causes a more prudent
behaviour.
5.1. no cycles at the stock market
Comparing the long-term impact of various shares of compensation based on stock prices β , for
low values of β an increase in performance based compensation does result in a higher interest
rate and higher market power. Output and credit supply are unaffected. For values of β above
some threshold (about β=0.5) output and credit supply are higher, but here the interest rate
is unaffected. Market power decreases for higher levels of β (figure 10). Representative runs
show (figures 11) there is a highly cyclical dynamic effect so that the reliability of those results
has to be handled with care. The sensitivity of the interest rate to the performance-based
remuneration share (figure 9) indicates that for large β , the interest rates across firms will be
less dispersed Therefore, growth differences among firms will be less dispersed, too. At the
same time, if the firm is financially sound the expected performance based payoff is relatively
high through the low bankruptcy probability. Any changes in the payoff weights have a rather
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(a) total output (b) average interest rate (c) Market Power
(d) Credit Supply (e) Credit Concentration
Figure 10: Impact of β
large effect through the performance based part because now it may change faster than the
fixed payoff. As a result, the optimal capital is lower for stable firms if more weight is put on
the performance based part because the possible stock price is then less influenced by capital.
Additionally, the probability of yielding that price is relatively sensitive. A lower level of capital
might then induce a comparatively higher probability and only a slightly lower possible price
whereas the net gain is positive in this case.
The marginal changes in the probability of bankruptcy and the stock price differ in β which
accounts for its effect on the long run dynamics. For firms any additional unit of capital
contributes to the growth perspective and to the probability of bankruptcy at the same time.
If a firm is highly leveraged its probability of bankruptcy is high, too. An additional unit
of capital however, will increase the profit perspective as the expected stock price increases.
This is based on the high probability of bankruptcy that increases less than the stock price
perspective increases. Remember that also the expected costs of bankruptcy depending on
the job loss increase slowly for highly leveraged firms.
Managers of financially sound firms who rely mostly on performance based compensation will
not risk the survival prospects and thus most of their payoff for only small increases in the
anticipated amount of payoff. Therefore, as this part of their salary becomes more important,
it is optimal for them to reduce capital and therefore the possible stock price by a little if
at the same time the survival probability increases significantly. Managers of leveraged firms
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can afford using more capital because the decrease in survival probability is meager but the
potential gain is huge. As performance based compensation becomes more important, the
gains by the anticipated price become more important and together with the only slight trade
off in the survival probability, it pays off to increase capital. In the long run leveraged firms
grow comparatively less because of higher interest rates. Colloquially expressed, leverage is
more costly for β = 1 and financial soundness is rewarded more for high levels of performance
based remuneration compared to a regime of fixed compensation.
If managers are affected more by the well being of the firm they act more prudently if they
also bear the downside risk. This induces less cyclical output dynamics except when there are
phases when their degree of participation changes due to stock market fads. The mood at the
stock market determines to what extent the managers’ downside risk is outweighed by gains
through profit. Also the design of the remuneration package determines to what extent their
salary is depending on the stock price. This design determines how much market moods affect
the bearing of risk.
(a) GDP Scen. (3) (b) Firm number with Scen. (3) (c) Average interest rate, Scen. (3)
(d) Market Power Scen. (3) (e) Bad Debt Scen. (3)
Figure 11: uncorrelated stock prices (β high)
The single run of high β reveals that the extreme case leads to unreasonable dynamics since
there are no business cycles visible (figure 11a). The number of firms is more or less stable
(figure 11b) and the interest rate fluctuates in a tight corridor but at a relatively high level
(figure 11c). Also the market power remains relatively stable at a low level (figure 11d).
5.2. volatility cycles
In this sub-section we will examine the effects of volatility cycles at the stock prices on the
dynamics in a strictly performance based remuneration situation. The volatility cycles are
supposed to reflect phases of wide-spread sensitivity of stock investors to news or data. They
are included by adding a cyclical drift to the random component of all stock prices.
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(a) GDP Scen. (3) (b) Firm number with Scen. (3) (c) Average interest rate, Scen. (3)
(d) Market Power Scen. (3) (e) Bad Debt Scen. (3)
Figure 12: stock prices with persistent volatility
In figure 12 it is visible that the stock investors’ mood has a significant impact on the dynamics.
Overall output shows about the same dynamics as with non-correlated stock prices (figure 12a).
The number of firms increases since there are almost no firms leaving (figures 12b and 12e).
Both, the interest rate (figure 12c) and market power (figure 12d) show rich dynamics but
there are no clear patterns identifiable that would emerge due to the drift in stock prices.
Figure 13 shows the credit demand conditional on the interest rate and its sensitivity to the
stock price extrapolation ε . The demand curve rotates in ε rather then being shifted. For
ε > 0 it becomes flatter, for ε < 0 it is steeper. This explains why there are more fluctuations
in the equilibrium interest rate but no clear responses to the cyclical volatility.
Credit demand is not higher or lower for all levels of interest as it would be with a shift of the
credit demand curve. The rotation results in more extreme interest rates.
For ε > 0 firms with tight constraints pay less credit but those who have plenty of credit
supplied pay comparatively more. For ε < 0 this impact is reversed because the credit demand
curve is steeper. Under supplied firms pay comparatively high interest rates and well supplied
firms pay comparatively less.
Thus, there are no phases where all firms pay relatively more or relatively less interest.
Economically, for extrapolations ε > 0 credit demand is less sensitive, for ε < 0 it is more
sensitive. This is because the expected payoff changes due to two things, the probability of
bankruptcy and the profit that is expected. For any ε the probability of bankruptcy changes
the same in the interest rate as does the profit that is expected. The stock price that is
expected, however changes less if ε < 0. This is a situation where the probability of bankruptcy
increases faster in capital than the possible payoff. Therefore, in times of low volatility the
capital demand is more sensitive.
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Figure 13: credit demand for different ε
(black→ ε = 0, red→ ε > 0, green→ ε < 0)
This section shows that managers adjust their behaviour to the stock market situation if their
payoff depends on it. If they face an asymmetric payoff pattern and bear the downside risk
of bankruptcy they have an incentive not to take too much risk. If they can benefit over
proportionally from firm profits due to an extrapolation of profit at the stock market they
act more accurate in a sense. This accuracy reveals in their willingness to pay interest for
a given level of credit. In times of volatile stock markets their willingness to pay interest is
much less elastic. Therefore, firms evolve more similarly but they pay high interest rates.
This hinders capital accumulation and growth. In times of changing volatility the fluctuations
lead to a more cyclical output pattern but in times where there are no changing intensities
of price changes the firms on average pay a high interest. These high average interest rates
are beneficial for the development of the economy since the bank makes higher profits and
through the monetary multiplier supplies much more credit to the firms. Hence the economy
grows fast. Moreover, in this setting it does not show any unusual behaviour over time, neither
with stock market volatility cycles nor without it. Therefore, governmental regulation would
not need to aim at restricting the share of payoff that depends on the performance. It is to
say that this may only hold in a world where the management actually bears some downside
risk as well.
6. Conclusive Remarks
The central point of this paper was to assess the impact of three known transmission channels
of stock prices to the real economy. Furthermore, a matter of interest was the influence of
cyclical stock price patterns in such transmissions. We discuss boom-bust cycles and phases
of persistent volatility using a particular transmission example.
This paper abstracts from the typical story of stock price influences on the real side of the
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economy. Usually, the focus lies on the demand side: increased output follows increased stock
prices because consumers possess a higher wealth and thus consume more. In this paper, the
supply side is explored looking at three channels that are known to link stock prices to the
real economy. All three channels deal with the influence that stock prices have on credit that
firms rely on in order to finance their production: banks use the stock price as proxy for firms’
prospects when evaluating creditworthiness, firms in financial distress might continue to exist
if the market assessment is good, and last, top managers of listed companies are paid by a
remuneration package that relies on stocks. Relying on an agent-based model that employs
credit and financial fragility as driver of output and firms’ growth dynamics the impact of the
stock market is visible in all three channels.
A central point of the examination is the mutual influence, therefore a computer simulation
is used in an agent-based model. The basis is an existing model by Delli Gatti et al. (2005)
which is able to reproduce business cycles and further stylized facts of firm sizes etc. Since
individual access to credit is key in this model it provided a sound basis for introducing the
intended links to stock prices and for carrying out a comparative analysis.
The simulation for all three channels shows that all of them have a non-negligible impact: first,
the effect of banks’ rating policy where it takes stock prices into account is non beneficial as
it reduces output and increases concentration. The reason is that the selection is even more
concentrated as the firms size matters less than equity which cancels out the advantage of
leverage. Leverage has an economy-wide advantage although a larger number of individual
firms go bankrupt along the way. There are fewer possibilities for firms to grow by applying
leverage. The importance of credit diminishes to the extent with which the bank takes the
stock price into account. As financial health exerts more impact in this case, some firms have
more persistent advantages and market dominance emerges earlier and is also more persistent.
This result relies, however, on the assumption that the stock price reflects to some extent the
firm’s equity.
Secondly, in cases of financial distress the stock market can determine whether the firm can
sustain or whether it will face legally declared bankruptcy. The amount of bargaining power
does not have a significant impact on the long run development of the economy if firms
face idiosyncratic impacts that cancel out on average. If the stock prices are correlated the
behaviour of firms becomes, too. Then it matters if the shareholders have a high bargaining
power. The cyclical stock prices result in pronounced business cycles but without long term
growth. Therefore, if there are boom bust periods on the stock market, it makes sense to
consider relying less on shareholders’ opinion in bankruptcy rulings.
Third, if managers are paid also in stocks, they are more prudent if stock prices are volatile
because they are assumed to be risk averse. Their behaviour impacts the economy in a more
complicated way. The impact that an increase in the performance based share has depends on
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the level of that share. Overall, the economy benefits from the managers having stakes in the
company because they act in a more sensitive manner. Even when there are boom bust periods
at the stock market and their compensation consist only of granted stock they do not take
excessive risk. Therefore, it is not necessary to limit the share of compensation based on per-
formance. This holds true because in this model the managers bear a significant downside risk.
All three channels have a significant impact on the dynamics of the economy. It matters
not only to what extent the stock price enters the decisions in the real economy but also to
what scope those decisions correlate. If there are phases of optimism or pessimism on the
stock market so are there correlation in real economy dynamics. Sometimes, if the stock price
does not have a significant impact itself from an aggregated point of view, the correlation
nevertheless may have, as seen in the bankruptcy scenario.
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A. Capital Demand for Stock Related Remuneration
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Define for the numerator:
−Ait−1gritβ (1+Eit + εit) =: Ψ1
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And for the denomiator:
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Such that
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.
Using Kit = Lit +Ait−1 ⇔ Lit = Kit −Ait−1 and with the equilibrium condition and capital
demand
Lsit =
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−Ait−1
this can be rearranged to
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leading to
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For this expression is of the form ar2it + brit + c= 0 for
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this can be solved, e.g. by using the p-q-form such that the known solution is
r1/2 =
−b±√b2−4ac
2a
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yielding
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Since r1 > r2, r2 is the interest rate that will emerge in equilibrium since firms yield the global
maximum profit with it.
B. Parameters and Variables
Control Parameters
stock price weight in credit supply µ [0,1]
influence of shareholders ns [0,1]
share of performance based remuneration β [0,1]
Parameters
productivity φ 0.1
retooling costs g 1.1
bankruptcy costs component c (cb) 1
weighing parameter for credit supply λ 0.3
interest spread coefficient ω 0.002
risk coefficient banking sector ν 0.08
entry parameter N 5
entry parameter d 100
entry parameter f 0.1
initial number of firms 100
Parameter Ranges for Robustness Check
productivity φ [0.05,0.15]
bankruptcy costs component c [0.5,1.5]
interest spread coefficient ω [0,0.004]
risk coefficient banking sector ν [0.05,0.1]
C. Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test
In order to check whether the results are robust, a Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is con-
ducted. The Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is performed because it allows for testing samples
where a normal distribution cannot be assumed and where the variance is unknown. It is a
non parametric test. The following procedure is as described by Sheskin (2011). Basically, the
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test is whether the medians of two sample populations (data sets) are likely to be the same at
a certain level of significance. If so, the two sample populations can be assumed to be drawn
from the same distribution. Some assumptions are essential for the test:
1. The observed data either constitute a random sample of N independent pairs of items.
2. The observed data are measured at a higher level than the ordinal scale.
3. The distribution of the population of difference scores between repeated measurements
of between matched items of individuals is approximately symmetric.
The Null-hypothesis is that the two populations which the results stem from do not differ in
their median ν : H0 : ν1 = ν2 while the alternative is for a two tailed test Halt : ν1 6= ν2. that is,
the median of population 2 is either below or above the median of population 1. The results
are checked for a significance level of 95%, that is α = 0.05. Each pair of data is compared
and the difference takenWi = x1i−x2i for all i= 1, ...,N. Zero differencesWi = 0 are discarded
and the sample size left is n. Since a two tailed test is conducted, the test statistics is the
minimum of the sums of negative and positive differences in the pairs of the samples,
W :=Min[|W−|,W+].
If the sample size is sufficiently large, W can be assumed to be normally distributed. Then, a
z-value can be computed using the number of nonzero differences n. This can also be done for
the continuation of data in order to better compare the continuous normal distribution with
discrete data in the form
z=
∣∣∣W − n(n+1)4 ∣∣∣−0.5√
n(n+1)(2n+1)
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.
In this test, the H0 hypothesis can be rejected if |z| ≥ zcrit where zcrit is the critical value at
a significance level chosen according to a table. For a significance level α = 0.05 the critical
value is zcrit = 1.645.
D. Robustness Check
The robustness check is aimed to see whether the results do hold qualitatively for a wider
range of parameters. Therefore,
1. intervals for parameter values are determined,
2. a number of random profiles is generated within the parameter ranges,
3. simulations are run for each setting of the control parameter under investigation for all
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µ rit Her f indahl Out put
µ = 0 vs. µ = 0.5 > < >
µ = 0.5 vs. µ = 1 x < x
µ = 0 vs. µ = 1 > < >
Table 1: Impact of µ
β rit Her f indahl Out put
β = 0 vs. β = 0.5 < < <
β = 0.5 vs. β = 1 < < <
β = 0 vs. β = 1 < < <
Table 2: Impact of β
of the random profiles.
4. Then, the generated results for each different control parameter setup are compared
using a Wilcoxon-Signed Rank test. This test reveals whether the output for the random
profiles is significantly different under a different control parameter value. If so, the
test provides also which output distribution has the higher median and thus provides
information for the impact of the relevant parameter.
In particular, the control parameters are µ ,ns, and β . Since ns has no impact, only robustness
of µ will be tested. Three levels of mu and β will be compared. The qualitative difference will
then be indicated with ">" if the mode is larger for the first distribution and with "<" vice
versa. If there is no significant difference, this will be indicated by "x".
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